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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3459 
_____________ 
 
JAMES A. BURKE, JR.,  
                                             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JOHN KRESTES; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF BERKS; THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 08-cv-04286) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a), 
October 4, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 14, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant James A. Burke, Jr. appeals the District Court’s adoption of a magistrate 
judge’s Report and Recommendation, dismissing Burke’s petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We affirm.  
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I. 
 Because we write for the parties, we discuss only the facts relevant to our 
conclusion.  Burke pled guilty to second-degree murder in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas.  Prior to his plea allocution before the court, 
Burke signed a “defendant’s statement accompanying request to enter a guilty plea,” 
where Burke acknowledged understanding the various constitutional rights he was 
waiving.  Burke handwrote answers to each question, signed the bottom of every page, 
and affirmed that he read and understood the entire document.  His counsel and an 
assistant district attorney also certified the document.  Specifically, Burke signed that he 
understood his rights to a presumption of innocence, a trial by a jury, and to confront his 
accusers and that by entering a plea of guilty, he was waiving those rights.  He also 
certified that he understood that he was pleading guilty to second degree murder and that 
the maximum penalty that could be imposed on him was life imprisonment.   
During his plea allocution, the judge did not advise Burke of the constitutional 
rights he was foregoing by entering a plea of guilty.  However, the judge did ask Burke if 
he understood the purpose of the plea and its significance.  Burke responded that he did.  
He also stated that he reviewed the plea statement and was satisfied with the 
representation of his counsel.  At his co-defendant’s trial, Burke testified that he expected 
to receive a life sentence.   
During his sentencing, Burke made an oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
which the sentencing judge denied.  Thereafter, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.  
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After his sentencing, Burke filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was never 
ruled upon.  
Burke filed three petitions for relief under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief 
Act (“PCRA”),  42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9541 et seq. (2011), each time challenging his 
plea and the effectiveness of his prior counsel.  All the petitions were denied.  
In his federal habeas petition, he raised over thirty grounds for relief.  In a 116-
page opinion, the District Court adopted the recommendations of the magistrate judge 
and dismissed the petition on the merits, but issued a certificate of appealability on four 
claims.  Specifically, the district court certified the following issues for appeal: whether 
(1) the trial court erred by conducting an inadequate colloquy to determine whether 
Burke’s plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily; (2) the state appeals court erred by 
finding that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily; (3) his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to ensure that the trial court conducted an adequate plea colloquy; 
and (4) whether his counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that his post-trial motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea was disposed of timely. 
II. 
After carefully reviewing the record and the submissions of the parties, we find no 
basis for disturbing the District Court's thorough and persuasive opinion and judgment.
1
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 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and we have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  When a district court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we exercise 
plenary review over a district court’s habeas decision. Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009).  Under 
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“ADEPA”), we afford the state courts’ legal and 
factual determinations considerable deference.  Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 391-392 (3d Cir. 2010). 
However, “if a properly preserved claim was not addressed by the state court on the merits, the deferential standards 
of AEDPA do not apply.” Id. at 392.  In such instances, a “federal habeas court must conduct a de novo review over 
pure legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact.”  Id. (quoting Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 2010 (3d Cir. 
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“Under Boykin, it is crucial that the record reveal not only that a defendant was aware of 
his rights, but also that he intelligently and understandingly waived them.” Taylor v. 
Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 440 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the 
plea colloquy coupled with Burke’s signed statement, his testimony at his co-defendant’s 
trial, and evidence that Burke discussed the consequences of his plea with his counsel 
was sufficient to establish that Burke pled guilty aware of the rights he was waiving and 
of the possible penalties he faced. Thus, his guilty plea was entered knowingly and 
voluntarily and is not deficient.  Similarly, as his plea was not deficient, his counsel did 
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and Burke was not prejudiced 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).  The District Court properly 
dismissed the ineffective assistance of counsel claims that relate to his plea.  
Burke’s last claim—that his counsel was ineffective for failing to take steps to 
ensure that Burke’s post-trial motion was addressed—implicates his speedy trial and due 
process rights. In deciding this claim, we examine the four Barker factors: (1) length of 
delay; (2) reason for delay; (3) defendant’s assertion of his rights, and (4) prejudice to the 
defendant. See United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 2009); Heiser v. Ryan, 
15 F.3d 299, 303-5 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying the same four factors for post-sentencing 
delays).  The District Court correctly held that despite the first three factors weighing in 
Burke’s favor, he is unable to demonstrate prejudice because, as in Heiser, the delay did 
not impair Burke’s ability to prove his habeas claims and he did not suffer any “unusual 
                                                                                                                                                  
2001)).  Given that only the lower PCRA courts addressed whether Burke’s plea was adequate, the District Court 
conducted a de novo review of Burke’s plea related claims.  While we do not necessarily adopt this conclusion, we 
note that since Burke’s claim fails a de novo review, it would also fail a more deferential ADEPA review.  
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or specific” anxiety relating to the delay.  See Heiser, 15 F.3d at 303-4, 305.  We affirm 
the District Court’s holding that Burke was not prejudiced by the delay and that his 
counsel was not constitutionally ineffective.  
III. 
 The District Court is affirmed.  
